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A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights

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  • Yi, Jianxin
  • Li, Yong

Abstract

In this paper, we generalize Green and Laffont’s (1979) impossibility theorem to the following form: in quasi-linear environments, when the set of each agent’s types is sufficiently rich, we cannot find mechanisms that allow bounded deviations from the decisive efficiency, incentive compatibility and budget-balance at the same time. Hence, it is impossible to find an incentive compatible mechanism with minimum social welfare losses. Furthermore, we discuss the compatibility problems between incentive and individual rights in a quasi-linear environment (see Sen, 1970a,b; Deb et al., 1997). Specifically, some new impossibility results are established.

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  • Yi, Jianxin & Li, Yong, 2016. "A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 79-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:81:y:2016:i:c:p:79-86
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Yi, Jianxin & Wang, Hefei & Li, Yong, 2018. "Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 113-117.

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