Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there is one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfies "strategy-proofness," "individual rationality," "no exploitation" and "nonbossiness." Any such procedure is a scheme of "semiconvex cost sharing" determined by the "minimum demand principle."
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Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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