Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
This note is to inform about a mistake in my paper (Serizawa, 1996). In that paper, I characterized strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balancing, non-exploitative and non-bossy social choice functions for economies with one public good and one private good. I established as Theorem 3 (page 507) that a social choice function is strategy-proof, individually rational with respect to endowment, budget-balancing, non-exploitative and non-bossy if and only if it is a scheme of "semi-convex cost sharing determined by the minimum demand principle". I also exposed one example (Example 2, page 507) in order to emphasize that non-bossiness is indispensable for this characterization. I claimed that the social choice function in that example satisfies the above axioms except for non-bossiness, and is not a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing. However, the social choice function in the example is actually not strategy-proof, as shown in the simple discussion below. Therefore it is an open question whether or not a similar characterization theorem holds without non-bossiness.
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Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: July 15, 1996|
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