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Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies

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  • Schummer, James

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  • Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:154-170
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    1. Swinkels, Jeroen M, 2001. "Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 37-68, January.
    2. Mark A. Satterthwaite, 2001. "Strategy-proofness and markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 37-58.
    3. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
    4. David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661.
    5. Cordoba, Jose M. & Hammond, Peter J., 1998. "Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 185-212, December.
    6. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
    7. Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-127, January.
    8. Glenn W. Harrison & Tanga McDaniel, 2008. "Voting games and computational complexity," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 546-565, July.
    9. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
    10. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
    11. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
    12. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November.
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    1. Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Dynamic Pay-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 98-111, February.
    2. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.
    3. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September.
    4. Herman Demeze & Issofa Moyouwou & Roland Pongou, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," Working Papers 1611e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    5. Yash Kanoria & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2021. "Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 509-524, March.
    6. Josue Ortega & Erel Segal-Halevi, 2019. "Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting," Papers 1908.02988, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2019.
    7. Jin Li & Jingyi Xue, 2013. "Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 597-622, November.
    8. Demeze, Herman & Moyouwou, Issofa & Pongou, Roland, 2016. "The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis," MPRA Paper 70607, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Yi, Jianxin & Li, Yong, 2016. "A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 79-86.

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