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Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange

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  • Cordoba, Jose M.
  • Hammond, Peter J.

Abstract

February 1998 In smooth exchange economies with a continuum of agents, any Walrasian mechanism is Pareto efficient, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy-proof. Barberà and Jackson's (1995) results imply that no such efficient mechanism is the limit of resource-balanced, individually rational, anonymous and non-bossy strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for an expanding sequence of finite economies. For a broad class of smooth random exchange economies, relaxing anonymity and non-bossiness admits mechanisms which, as the economy becomes infinitely large, are asymptotically Walrasian for all except one ``balancing'' agent, while being manipulable with generically vanishing probability. Also considered are some extensions to non-Walrasian mechanisms. JEL classification: D82, D61, D5 Keywords: strategy-proofness, mechanism design, random economies, Walrasian equilibrium.
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Suggested Citation

  • Cordoba, Jose M. & Hammond, Peter J., 1998. "Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 185-212, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:185-212
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
    3. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2016. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," TSE Working Papers 16-677, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
    5. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Kovalenkov, Alexander, 2002. "Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 475-487, April.
    7. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2014. "Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-49.
    8. Matthew Jackson & Ilan Kremer, 2007. "Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(3), pages 185-198, November.
    9. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2004. "Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 103-116, October.
    10. Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2004. "The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 371-392, June.
    12. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2017. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategy-proofness; mechanism design; random economies; walrasian equilibrium.
    (this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
    ;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium

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