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Perfect Competition as the Blueprint for Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Makowski

    (UC Davis)

  • Joseph M. Ostroy

    (UCLA)

  • Uzi Segal

    (University of Western Ontario)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 1995. "Perfect Competition as the Blueprint for Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 745, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:745
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp745.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1990. "The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521388702, March.
    2. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
    3. Debreu, Gerard, 1970. "Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(3), pages 387-392, May.
    4. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
    5. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 103-127, January.
    6. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1979. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 395, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
    8. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
    9. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Kleinberg, Norman L., 1980. "Fair allocations and equal incomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 189-200, October.
    11. Hurwicz, Leonid & Walker, Mark, 1990. "On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 683-704, May.
    12. Donald John Roberts & Andrew Postlewaite, 1973. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior In Large Economies," Discussion Papers 44, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Paul Champsaur & Guy Laroque, 1982. "A Note on Incentives in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 627-635.
    14. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1981. "Fair allocations in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 269-282, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba & Emma Moreno-García, 2006. "Union games: technological unemployment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(2), pages 359-373, January.

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