IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cea/doctra/e2003_12.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dominant Strategies Implementation when Compensations are Allowed:a Characterization Fundación

Author

Abstract

Dominant strategies truthful implementation of flexible social objectives involves the ability of the planner to alter the individual incentives in such a way that the externality imposed on society by each agent reporting a given type is fully internalized in the agent’s final payoff. In other words, the agents’ objective function must mimic the social objectives. We find that our main result is robust enough to explain why well-known mechanisms like Groves’s transfers work in some contexts while some other social objectives are not implementable in dominant strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Perote Peña, 2003. "Dominant Strategies Implementation when Compensations are Allowed:a Characterization Fundación," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/12, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  • Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_12
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://public.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es/pdfs/E200312.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
    2. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    3. Hurwicz, Leonid & Walker, Mark, 1990. "On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 683-704, May.
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    5. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Individual decisiveness; compensation mechanisms; dominant strategies.;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Susana Mérida). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fcanges.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.