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Manipulation Through Bribes

  • James Schummer

We consider allocation rules that choose both a public outcome and transfers, based on the agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents. A rule is bribe-proof if such opportunities never arise (including the case in which the briber and bribee are the same agent). The central result is that under a bribe-proof rule, regardless of the domain of admissible valuations, the payoff to any one agent is a continuous function of any other agent's reported valuations. We then show that on connected domains of valuation functions, if either the set of outcomes is finite or each agent's set of admissible valuations is smoothly connected, then an agent's payoff is a constant function of other agents' reported valuations. Finally, under the additional assumption of a standard richness condition on the set of admissible valuations, a bribe-proof rule must be a constant function.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1207.

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Date of creation: Jun 1997
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1207
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  1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
  2. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  3. Cremer, Jacques, 1996. "Manipulations by Coalitions Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 39-73, March.
  4. G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997. "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 259-294.
  5. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  6. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 243-54, April.
  7. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  8. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
  9. Schummer, James, 2000. "Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 293-318, February.
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