Informed Planner, Decentralized Decisions And Incentive Compatibility
The results on the design of incentive compatible mechanisms for implementing public decisions establish that there is no general solution to the incentive problem if the mechanisms are required to be informationally decentralized. However, even when the planner possesses the knowledge of the agents' characteristics, he may need to reach these decisions through a decentralized decision mechanism, in which the agents act in accordance with their incentives to select the public decision. Thus, even within a complete information model with an informed planner, one may need to find mechanisms that implement public decisions via decentralized decisions of the agents. We show that there exists a mechanism which resolves this problem.
|Date of creation:||Oct 1996|
|Date of revision:||Oct 1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal,"
481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- D. B. Bernheim, 2010.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
514, David K. Levine.
- Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992.
"Individual Rights Revisited,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 161-77, May.
- Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975.
"Incentives and public inputs,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 243-54, April.
- Sen, Manimay, 1983. "Implementable social choice rules : Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong nash equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
- Conn, David, 1983. "The scope of satisfactory mechanisms for the provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 249-263, March.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979.
"Incentives and incomplete information,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms,"
368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
- Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-27, January.
- Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, 1976.
"Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem',"
144, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
- Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996.
"Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 194-212, April.
- Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Kotaro Suzumura, 1992. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluations: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Paper Series a250, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, June.
- Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.