IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds

  • Duygu Yengin


    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating collectively owned indivisible goods or bads when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k-fairness. We also compare the strength and associated budget deficits of and the logical relations between the aforementioned lower bounds.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Adelaide, School of Economics in its series School of Economics Working Papers with number 2012-05.

in new window

Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2012-05
Contact details of provider: Postal: Adelaide SA 5005
Phone: (618) 8303 5540
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  2. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, 06.
  3. Alkan, Ahmet, 1994. "Monotonicity and Envyfree Assignments," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 605-16, May.
  4. Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
  5. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-20, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  6. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
  7. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-27, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  8. Moulin, H., 1988. "Welfare Bounds In The Fair Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 106-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  9. Porter, Ryan & Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Fair imposition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 209-228, October.
  10. Yengin, Duygu, 2013. "Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 389-397.
  11. Hyungjun Kim, 2004. "Population monotonic rules for fair allocation problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 59-70, 08.
  12. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
  13. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
  14. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1993. "The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 117-132, February.
  15. Bevia, Carmen, 1996. "Population monotonicity in economies with one indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 125-137, October.
  16. Hervé Moulin, 2010. "Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 193-216, February.
  17. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  18. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  19. Fleurbaey, Marc, 1995. "Equality and responsibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 683-689, April.
  20. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  21. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November.
  22. Thomson, William, 1995. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 229-46, March.
  23. Duygu Yengin, 2010. "Egalitarian-equivalent Groves Mechanisms in the Allocation of Heterogeneous Objects," School of Economics Working Papers 2010-29, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  24. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  25. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2012-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dmitriy Kvasov)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.