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Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms

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  • Hervé Moulin

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  • Hervé Moulin, 2010. "Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 193-216, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:2:p:193-216
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ando, Kazutoshi & Kato, Miki & Ohseto, Shinji, 2008. "Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 14-23, January.
    2. Porter, Ryan & Shoham, Yoav & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Fair imposition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 209-228, October.
    3. Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
    4. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
    5. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sprumont, Yves, 2013. "Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1102-1121.
    2. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2011. "Choosing and sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 296-300, September.
    3. Itai Ashlagi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2012. "Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 531-542, March.
    4. Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00983085, HAL.
    5. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:9-39 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2015. "Strategy-Proof Rule in Probabilistic Allocation Problem of an Indivisible Good and Money," ISER Discussion Paper 0931, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Yu Nakayama, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object," ISER Discussion Paper 0961, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    8. Yengin, Duygu, 2013. "Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 389-397.
    9. You, Jung S., 2015. "Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 166-190.

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