Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds
The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating collectively owned indivisible goods or bads when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k-fairness. We also compare the strength and associated budget deficits of and the logical relations between the aforementioned lower bounds.
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