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Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency

Listed author(s):
  • Kazuhiko Hashimoto

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

  • Hiroki Saitoh

    ()

    (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)

Registered author(s):

    In this paper, we consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, we also give a characterization of the equally distributed pairwise pivotal rule, as the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare and budget-balance.

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    File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0817.pdf
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    Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 08-17.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2008
    Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0817
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/e_HP/e_g_shiryo.html
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    1. Mitra, Manipushpak, 2005. "Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(1), pages 251-266, August.
    2. Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March.
    3. Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2004. "Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-291, August.
    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
    5. Chun, Youngsub, 2006. "A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 171-181, March.
    6. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December.
    7. Manipushpak Mitra, 2001. "Mechanism design in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(2), pages 277-305.
    8. Debasis Mishra & Bharath Rangarajan, 2007. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 369-382, October.
    9. Manipushpak Mitra, 2002. "Achieving the first best in sequencing problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 75-91.
    10. Ando, Kazutoshi & Kato, Miki & Ohseto, Shinji, 2008. "Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 14-23, January.
    11. Youngsub Chun & Eun Jeong Heo, 2007. "Queueing Problems with Two Parallel Servers," ISER Discussion Paper 0683, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    12. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "No-envy in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 151-162, September.
    13. Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2011. "Group strategyproofness in queueing models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 242-254, May.
    14. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
    15. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0648, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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