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Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem

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  • Debasis Mishra
  • Bharath Rangarajan

Abstract

A set of jobs need to be served by a server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The jobs share their costs through compensation using monetary transfers. In the first part, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value rule by introducing some fairness axioms that are new in the literature. In the second part, we use linear programming duality to provide an alternate characterization of the Shapley value rule. Here, we use the idea of decomposition of transfers and the notion of pairwise no-envy allocation. Of the family of allocation rules that satisfy pairwise noenvy, the Shapley value rule is the one with the minimum sum of absolute values of transfers. We discuss no-envy rules and show that no-envy is not possible in general. If processing times of all jobs are equal, then it is possible to design no-envy rules, and we characterize all no-envy rules for this case.
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Suggested Citation

  • Debasis Mishra & Bharath Rangarajan, 2007. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 369-382, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:3:p:369-382
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0210-3
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    3. Debasis Mishra & Bharath Rangarajan, 2007. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 369-382, October.
    4. Moulin, Herve, 2004. "On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting and Transferring of Jobs," Working Papers 2004-04, Rice University, Department of Economics.
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    7. Youngsub Chun, 2011. "Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 29-41, February.
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    10. Youngsub Chun, 2006. "No-envy in queueing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 151-162, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ju, Yuan & Chun, Youngsub & van den Brink, René, 2014. "Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 33-45.
    2. Cheng‐Kuang Wu & Yi‐Ming Chen & Dachrahn Wu & Ching‐Lin Chi, 2020. "A Game Theory Approach for Assessment of Risk and Deployment of Police Patrols in Response to Criminal Activity in San Francisco," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(3), pages 534-549, March.
    3. Banerjee, Sreoshi, 2023. "Stability and fairness in sequencing games: optimistic approach and pessimistic scenarios," MPRA Paper 118680, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer, 2010. "When queueing is better than push and shove," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 409-430, July.
    5. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.
    6. Debasis Mishra & Bharath Rangarajan, 2007. "Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 369-382, October.
    7. Banerjee, Sreoshi, 2024. "On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in "generalized" sequencing games," MPRA Paper 120188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. René Brink & Youngsub Chun, 2012. "Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 519-529, March.
    9. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    10. Fan Zhang & Pramode Verma, 2011. "Pricing multi-class network services using the Shapley Value," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 61-75, April.
    11. Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan & Jason R. Marden & Adam Wierman, 2014. "Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 1252-1296, November.
    12. Andreas S. Schulz & Nelson A. Uhan, 2010. "Sharing Supermodular Costs," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 58(4-part-2), pages 1051-1056, August.
    13. Demetrescu, Camil & Lupia, Francesco & Mendicelli, Angelo & Ribichini, Andrea & Scarcello, Francesco & Schaerf, Marco, 2019. "On the Shapley value and its application to the Italian VQR research assessment exercise," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 87-104.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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