Group strategyproofness in queueing models
We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit at all profiles and the mechanism which runs the least budget surplus. We also show that while k-pivotal mechanisms are also weak group strategyproof, strong group strategyproofness and efficiency are incompatible.
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