Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model
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- Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
- Hervé Moulin & Scott Shenker, 2001. "Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 511-533.
- Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
- Suresh Mutuswami, 2000. "Strategy proof mechanisms for cost sharing," Economics Discussion Papers 520, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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