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Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: The Role of Indifferences

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  • Ruben Juarez

    () (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Abstract

Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indi erent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indi erent agent does not get a unit of good. GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP andMIN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good. Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruben Juarez, 2012. "Group Strategyproof Cost Sharing: The Role of Indifferences," Working Papers 201202, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201202
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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_12-2.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2016. "Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 749-766, April.
    2. Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013. "Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 359-403, October.
    3. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:59-83 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jin Li & Jingyi Xue, 2013. "Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 597-622, November.
    5. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0538-6 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost sharing; Mechanism design; Group strategyproof; Tie-breaking rule;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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