On Mechanisms for Costly Inclusion
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More about this item
Keywordsgame theory; second price auction; free-rider problem; pivot mechanism; Walrasian price; production.;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DES-2019-01-14 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2019-01-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2019-01-14 (Microeconomics)
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