Report NEP-DES-2019-01-14
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2021, "On Groves Mechanisms for Costly Inclusion," Working Papers, University of Windsor, Department of Economics, number 1901, Jul.
- Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2018, "Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1812.10326, Dec, revised Jul 2021.
- Tim Roughgarden & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2018, "Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1812.11896, Dec, revised Aug 2020.
- Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017, "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 83199, Sep.
- Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2018, "Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 18-056.
- Item repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_063_2018 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018, "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 133, Dec.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2019-01-14.html