Modularity and greed in double auctions
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.008
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- Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021.
"A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
- Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1249, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Xu, Hedong & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong & Fan, Suohai, 2018. "Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 330(C), pages 125-133.
- Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Tim Roughgarden & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2018. "Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design," Papers 1812.11896, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mechanism design; Double auctions; Trade reduction mechanism; Deferred-acceptance auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
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