IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/uclatw/815595000000000009.html

Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Art Shneyerov

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Art Shneyerov, 2006. "Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:815595000000000009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ubc.ca/discpapers/dp0312.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007. "Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 550-567, March.
    4. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
    5. Gale,Douglas, 2000. "Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644105, August.
    6. Daniel F. Spulber, 1996. "Market Microstructure and Intermediation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 135-152, Summer.
    7. Dale T. Mortensen, 1982. "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 233-258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
    9. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Microeconomics.ca working papers shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Dec 2003.
    10. Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
    11. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 842-863, August.
    12. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February.
    13. Steven R. Williams, 1991. "Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 351-374.
    14. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
    16. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78.
    17. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
    18. John Rust & George Hall, 2003. "Middlemen versus Market Makers: A Theory of Competitive Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-403, April.
    19. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    20. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-1063, September.
    21. Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
    22. Martin W. Cripps & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 2006. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 47-92, January.
    23. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    24. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1989. "The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 477-498.
    25. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 220-245, September.
    26. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 2002. "The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1841-1863, September.
    27. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, 1983. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 835-851, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Stephan Lauermann, 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 663-689, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Microeconomics.ca working papers shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Dec 2003.
    2. Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2010. "The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1164-1187, May.
    3. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2007. "Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 155-200, January.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 435-467, July.
    5. Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2010. "Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 748-762, March.
    6. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    7. Stephan Lauermann, 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 663-689, April.
    8. Sanghoon Kim, 2024. "Informed agent’s advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 143(2), pages 183-205, October.
    9. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    10. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2016. "An optimistic search equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 89-114, June.
    11. Sarkar, Soumendu, 2018. "Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 37-46.
    12. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022. "Price discovery using a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 57-83.
    14. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2007. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Matching and Bargaining Mechanism," Microeconomics.ca working papers shneyerov-07-05-01-03-43-, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 May 2007.
    15. Kadan, Ohad, 2007. "Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 495-513, July.
    16. Yangwei Song, 2025. "Robust auctions with affiliated private values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(2), pages 245-279, June.
    17. Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2014. "Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 248-263.
    19. Ohad Kadan, 2004. "Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values," Working Papers 2004.12, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    20. Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Optimal mechanism for land acquisition," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 87-116, March.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:815595000000000009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.