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Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs

  • Art Shneyerov

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 815595000000000009.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:815595000000000009
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Gianni De Fraja & Jozsef Sakovics, 1999. "Walras Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price," ESE Discussion Papers 36, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
  4. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, November.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2004. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2033, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
  8. Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
  9. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78.
  10. Daniel F. Spulber, 1996. "Market Microstructure and Intermediation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 135-152, Summer.
  11. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February.
  12. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 220-245, September.
  13. Aldo Rustichini, 1992. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 995, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
  15. Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
  16. Martin W Cripps & Jeroen M Swinkels, 2003. "Efficiency of Large Double Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000329, David K. Levine.
  17. Gale,Douglas, 2000. "Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644105, November.
  18. Douglas Gale, 2010. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 621, David K. Levine.
  19. John Rust & George Hall, 2002. "Middlemen versus Market Makers: A Theory of Competitive Exchange," NBER Working Papers 8883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Steven R. Williams, 1991. "Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 351-374.
  21. Mark Satterthwaite & Artyom Shneyerov, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Discussion Papers 1384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  23. Dale T. Mortensen, 1979. "The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game," Discussion Papers 384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
  25. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1989. "The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 477-498.
  26. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 2002. "The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1841-1863, September.
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