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Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach

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  • Stephan Lauermann

Abstract

Dynamic matching and bargaining games are models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific matching and bargaining games. (JEL C73, C78, D82, D83)

Suggested Citation

  • Stephan Lauermann, 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 663-689, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:2:p:663-89
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.663
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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