Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
A model of a market with pairwise meetings is developed in which traders have asymmetric information about the true state of the world. The focus is on information transmission. The main questions concern the extent to which the information is revealed to uninformed agents through the trade process and, in particular, whether nearly frictionless versions of this market give rise to full revelation results, as obtained by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and competitive markets. It turns out that, in equilibrium, the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents, even when the market is approximately frictionless. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 58 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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