Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search
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- Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2010.
"Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information,"
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- repec:the:publsh:2416 is not listed on IDEAS
- YIlmaz, Ensar, 2011. "Income distribution, efficiency and rationing," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1247-1255, May.
- Elliott, Matt & Nava, Francesco, 2018. "Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Stephan Lauermann, 2013.
"Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach,"
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- Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 435-467, July.
- Lauermann, Stephan, 2012. "Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: An inversion result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1969-1997.
- Elliott, M. & Nava, F., 2017. "Decentralized Bargaining in Matching Markets: Efficient Stationary Equilibria and the Core," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1742, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Shneyerov, Artyom, 2014. "A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 314-317.
- Yilmaz, Ensar & Ünveren, Burak, 2011. "Income distribution and exchange in a dynamic search model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 665-678, October.
- Carlos Canon, 2011. "Matching & Information Provision by One-Sided and Two-Sided Platforms," Working Papers 11-20, NET Institute, revised Oct 2011.
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