Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition
We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits indivisible goods.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1996|
|Date of revision:||Jul 1998|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Theory 15:279-296 (2000)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel|
Web page: http://volij.co.il/
|Order Information:||Web: http://volij.co.il/addr.html|
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