Contracts and Domination in Competitive Economies
A new concept of contract-based domination by coalitions for competitive economies is proposed and studied in the paper. This concept is based on the notion of (barter) contract (an elementary exchange of commodities). Here classical coalitions domination is transferred onto systems (webs) of contracts and this way implemented contractual allocations which stability properties are investigated. It is shown that suggested approach is efficiently modeling perfect competition conditions and allows to describe various known classical concepts for a perfect economy – equilibria, core, fuzzy core etc. – in pure game-theoretical terms. For non-perfect economies, in which not every contract is permissible, it may serve as one of the model primitives to refine and to solve various theoretical problems.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
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