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Contracts and Domination in Competitive Economies

  • Marakulin, V.

    (Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia)

A new concept of contract-based domination by coalitions for competitive economies is proposed and studied in the paper. This concept is based on the notion of (barter) contract (an elementary exchange of commodities). Here classical coalitions domination is transferred onto systems (webs) of contracts and this way implemented contractual allocations which stability properties are investigated. It is shown that suggested approach is efficiently modeling perfect competition conditions and allows to describe various known classical concepts for a perfect economy – equilibria, core, fuzzy core etc. – in pure game-theoretical terms. For non-perfect economies, in which not every contract is permissible, it may serve as one of the model primitives to refine and to solve various theoretical problems.

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Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
Pages: 10-32

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Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:9:p:10-32
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  1. Madden, Paul J, 1975. "Efficient Sequences of Non-Monetary Exchange," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 581-96, October.
  2. Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Staff General Research Papers 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier.
  4. : Karl Vind, 1993. "Perfect Competition or the Core," Discussion Papers 93-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Gale, Douglas, 1978. "The core of a monetary economy without trust," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 456-491, December.
  6. Monique Florenzano & Valeri Marakulin, 2000. "Production Equilibria in Vector Lattices," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1396, Econometric Society.
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  9. Muhamet Yildiz, 2002. "Walrasian Bargaining," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000003, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Graham, Daniel A. & Peter Jennergren, L. & Peterson, David W. & Roy Weintraub, E., 1976. "Trader-commodity parity theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 443-454, June.
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