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Private information, transferable utility, and the core

  • S. Flåm

    ()

  • L. Koutsougeras

    ()

Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the other for knowledge. Focus is on specific, computable solutions that are generated by such prices and belong to the private core. Solutions of that sort obtain under standard regularity assumptions.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-008-0416-y
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 42 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 591-609

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:3:p:591-609
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