Sharing Nonconvex Costs
The paper analyses cooperative games with side payments. Each player facesa possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggreagate members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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