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The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information

  • Geoffroy de Clippel

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004-18.

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Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-18
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Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," UC3M Working papers. Economics we055726, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  2. DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1733, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Yves Balasko & David Cass & Karl Shell, 1988. "Market Participation and Sunspot Equilibria," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 88.03, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
  5. Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
  6. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  7. Oscar Volij, 1997. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information 9711001, EconWPA.
  8. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 99-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  10. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  11. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
  12. Karl Shell & Aditya Goenka, 1997. "Robustness of sunspot equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 79-98.
  13. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 767, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
  15. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  16. Peraz-Castrillo, J., 1992. "Cooperative Outcomes Through Non-Cooperative Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 165.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  17. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  18. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, December.
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