Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection
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- de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007.
"The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information,"
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- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010.
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12-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Oct 2012.
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- Inderst, Roman, 2005. "Matching markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 145-166, April.
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