Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information
Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63-91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another. Two weaker positive properties are formulated.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007.
"The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
- Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 441-443.
- Varian, Hal R., 1974.
"Equity, envy, and efficiency,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
- Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
- Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2002.
"Fairness under Uncertainty,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208.
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