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Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies

Author

Listed:
  • Chiara Donnini

    ()

  • Maria Graziano

    ()

  • Marialaura Pesce

    ()

Abstract

In this paper we propose a concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when agents are asymmetrically informed and the equity of allocations is evaluated at the interim stage. Copyright Springer-Verlag Wien 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Chiara Donnini & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 55-68, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:111:y:2014:i:1:p:55-68
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-012-0322-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2008. "Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 265-267, May.
    2. Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold, 1975. "Coalitional Fairness of Allocations in Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 661-668, July.
    3. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
    4. Zhou, Lin, 1992. "Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 158-175.
    5. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    6. Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999. "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 155-185, June.
    7. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2002. "Fairness under Uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-7.
    8. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-816, July.
    9. Luciano Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas Yannelis, 2011. "Core and equilibria under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 519-548, October.
    10. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2002. "Fairness under Uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-7.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Achille Basile & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Ciro Tarantino, 2018. "Coalitional fairness with participation rates," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(2), pages 97-139, March.
    2. Achille Basile & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 573-599, April.
    3. Bhowmik, Anuj, 2014. "Coalitional Fairness: The Case of Exact Feasibility with Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 52788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Chiara Donnini, 2013. "On a notion à la Gabszewicz of fairness in coalitional economies," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2013(110), pages 35-55.
    5. Anuj Bhowmik & Maria Gabriella Graziano, 2018. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," CSEF Working Papers 510, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    6. Anuj Bhowmik, 2015. "Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 461-494, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equity; Envy; Efficiency; Asymmetric information; C71; D51; D82;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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