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Are Asymmetrically Informed Agents Envious?

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Abstract

In most economies, a fair allocation does not exist. Thus, it seems that we are condemned to live in an unfair world, since we are not happy with what we have and we look at the others with envious eyes. In this paper we want to give an hope for a more equitable society.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Laura Pesce, 2011. "Are Asymmetrically Informed Agents Envious?," CSEF Working Papers 292, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:292
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2008. "Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 265-267, May.
    2. Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1991. "Envy-free and efficient allocations in large public good economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 227-232, July.
    3. Klaus, Bettina, 2009. ""Fair marriages": An impossibility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 74-75, October.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:18:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2002. "Fairness under Uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(18), pages 1-7.
    6. Luciano Castro & Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas Yannelis, 2011. "Core and equilibria under ambiguity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 519-548, October.
    7. Chiara Donnini & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Maria Laura Pesce, 2010. "Fairness Properties of Constrained Market Equilibria," CSEF Working Papers 245, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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    Cited by:

    1. Achille Basile & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 573-599, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; fair allocation; constrained market equilibrium; Maximin and Bayesian expected utility function.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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