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College Choice Mechanism: The Respect of the Vagueness of Choices

Author

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  • Litsa Alexandra

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, Center of Research in Economics and Management, Caen, France)

  • Maguet Jean-François

    (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, Center of Research in Economics and Management, Caen, France)

Abstract

Taking as a starting point the theory of matching applied in the case of a problem of college admissions, where one is interested only to strict preference profiles for students and colleges, a part of the literature has been oriented towards profiles of priorities for colleges. In this paper we will assume that students have also their own priorities to which is associated some 'fuzzy'. This vagueness designates the preference of an individual (resp. college) for a college relative to parameters that characterize the latter one (resp. individual). Thus, we talk about fuzzy priorities. Our purpose is to analyze this aspect and to propose a real-life mechanism which will take into consideration the fuzzy priority profiles of both students and colleges, in order to achieve the best possible matching that is stable, strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and fair.

Suggested Citation

  • Litsa Alexandra & Maguet Jean-François, 2012. "College Choice Mechanism: The Respect of the Vagueness of Choices," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201202, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201202
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    File URL: https://crem-doc.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2012/201202.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Klaus, Bettina, 2009. ""Fair marriages": An impossibility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 74-75, October.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 364-367.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 364-367.
    5. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2001. "`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 197-212.
    6. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2004. "A note on gender fairness in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 211-217, March.
    7. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    8. Roth, Alvin E & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1989. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 559-570, May.
    9. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
    10. EHLERS, Lars, 2010. "School Choice with Control," Cahiers de recherche 2010-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    11. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; Priorities; Preferences; Fuzzy; Algorithm; Matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being

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