College Choice Mechanism: The Respect of the Vagueness of Choices
Taking as a starting point the theory of matching applied in the case of a problem of college admissions, where one is interested only to strict preference profiles for students and colleges, a part of the literature has been oriented towards profiles of priorities for colleges. In this paper we will assume that students have also their own priorities to which is associated some 'fuzzy'. This vagueness designates the preference of an individual (resp. college) for a college relative to parameters that characterize the latter one (resp. individual). Thus, we talk about fuzzy priorities. Our purpose is to analyze this aspect and to propose a real-life mechanism which will take into consideration the fuzzy priority profiles of both students and colleges, in order to achieve the best possible matching that is stable, strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and fair.
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