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The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

  • Fuhito Kojima

    ()

  • M. Ünver

    ()

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce two new axioms; favoring higher ranks and rank-respecting invariance. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it favors higher ranks and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by favoring higher ranks, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and rank-respecting invariance. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 55 (2014)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 515-544

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:55:y:2014:i:3:p:515-544
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