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The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism

  • Fuhito Kojima

    ()

    (Stanford University)

  • M. Utku Ünver

    (Boston College)

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it respects preference rankings and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and an auxiliary invariance property. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by respect of preference rankings, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and the auxiliary invariance property.

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Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 729.

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Date of creation: 04 Feb 2010
Date of revision: 08 Oct 2010
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:729
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  2. Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2008. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 757.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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  11. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-89, June.
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  16. Yan Chen & Tayfun Sönmez, 2004. "School Choice: An Experimental Study," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 622, Boston College Department of Economics.
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  21. Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 715, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2014.
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