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The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Fuhito Kojima

    (Stanford University)

  • M. Utku Ünver

    (Boston College)

Abstract

The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it respects preference rankings and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and an auxiliary invariance property. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by respect of preference rankings, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and the auxiliary invariance property.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuhito Kojima & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 729, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Oct 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:729
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Chen, Yan & Onur, Kesten, 2013. "From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    3. Troyan, Peter, 2012. "Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 936-947.
    4. Chen, Yan & Kesten, Onur, 2019. "Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 83-100.
    5. Thayer Morrill, 2013. "An alternative characterization of top trading cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 181-197, September.
    6. Nanyang Bu, 2014. "Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 635-645, October.

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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