IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v83y2017i2d10.1007_s11238-017-9598-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fair student placement

Author

Listed:
  • José Alcalde

    (University of Alicante)

  • Antonio Romero-Medina

    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as $$\upalpha $$ α -equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that $$\upalpha $$ α -equity is compatible with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to the allocations improving, in terms of efficiency, the Student Optimal Stable allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9598-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9598-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-017-9598-8
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-017-9598-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.
    2. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
    3. Klijn, Flip & Masso, Jordi, 2003. "Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 91-100, January.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
    5. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
    6. Lars Ehlers, 2008. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(2), pages 327-335, May.
    7. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
    9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
    10. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    11. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 417-435, May.
    12. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-689, June.
    13. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    14. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1974. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 441-443.
    15. Ehlers, Lars & Erdil, Aytek, 2010. "Efficient assignment respecting priorities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 1269-1282, May.
    16. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May.
    17. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    18. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics.
    19. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, 1999. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 21-44, January.
    20. Tang, Qianfeng & Yu, Jingsheng, 2014. "A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 543-561.
    21. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
    22. Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2010. "The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 937-949, September.
    23. Morrill, Thayer, 2015. "Making just school assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 18-27.
    24. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    25. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    26. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
    27. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    28. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    29. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    30. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
    31. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    32. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    33. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    34. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
    35. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
    36. Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Mert Dur, 2020. "Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 477-494, October.
    2. Han, Xiang, 2018. "Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-20.
    3. José Alcalde & Begoña Subiza, 2014. "Affirmative action and school choice," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(3), pages 295-312, September.
    4. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    5. Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
    6. Yuen Leng Chow & Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, 2015. "Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 432-470, June.
    7. José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2017. "Fair student placement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 293-307, August.
    8. Doğan, Battal, 2016. "Responsive affirmative action in school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 69-105.
    9. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    10. Troyan, Peter & Delacrétaz, David & Kloosterman, Andrew, 2020. "Essentially stable matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 370-390.
    11. Alcalde, Jose & Subiza, Begoña, 2011. "On Integration Policies and Schooling," MPRA Paper 29145, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    13. Dur, Umut Mert & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "What you don't know can help you in school assignment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 246-256.
    14. Alcalde, Jose & Silva-Reus, José Ángel, 2013. "Allocating via Priorities," QM&ET Working Papers 13-3, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "Fair School Placement," QM&ET Working Papers 11-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    2. Fuhito Kojima & M. Ünver, 2014. "The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 515-544, April.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2014. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 39(4), pages 949-966, November.
    5. Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2021. "Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 533-552, March.
    6. Alcalde, Jose & Subiza, Begoña, 2011. "On Integration Policies and Schooling," MPRA Paper 29145, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito & Narita, Yusuke, 2016. "Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 186-211.
    8. Harless, Patrick, 2014. "A School Choice Compromise: Between Immediate and Deferred Acceptance," MPRA Paper 61417, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
    10. Diebold, Franz & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Matching with indifferences: A comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 268-282.
    11. Kesten, Onur & Unver, Utku, 2015. "A theory of school choice lotteries," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    12. Mustafa Og̃uz Afacan & Zeynel Harun Aliog̃ulları & Mehmet Barlo, 2017. "Sticky matching in school choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 509-538, October.
    13. Han, Xiang, 2018. "Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-20.
    14. Fuhito Kojima & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 729, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Oct 2010.
    15. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    16. Troyan, Peter & Morrill, Thayer, 2020. "Obvious manipulations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    17. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Kojima, Fuhito, 2015. "Efficient assignment with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 54-86.
    18. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
    19. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima & Yusuke Narita, 2011. "Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach," Working Papers 2011-018, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    20. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Student placement; Fair matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9598-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.