Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets
Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale- Chapley stability and S-stability. The first one applies best to markets were no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem does not exist, and present a family of agents' preferences for which existence is guaranteed for both Gale-Shapley stable and t-stable outcomes.
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Volume (Year): 1 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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