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Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets

  • José Alcalde

Two stability concepts for one-sided matching markets are analyzed: Gale- Chapley stability and S-stability. The first one applies best to markets were no status quo allocation is considered, whereas the second one is a solution to be used when property rights are allowed. A common problem of existence is shared by both solution concepts. Hence, we study economic environments where this problem does not exist, and present a family of agents' preferences for which existence is guaranteed for both Gale-Shapley stable and t-stable outcomes.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02716626
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 1 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 275-287

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:275-287
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  1. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 1991. "Vector mappings with diagonal images," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 57-67, August.
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  3. Begoña Subiza Martínez, 1993. "Numerical Representation Of Acyclic Preferences," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-09, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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  5. José Alcalde, 1995. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. José Alcalde, 1995. "Exchange-Proofness or Divorce-Proofness? Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Mirman, L.J. & Samuelson, L. & Urbano, A., 1989. "Monopoly Experimentation," Papers 8-89-7, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    • Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry & Urbano, Amparo, 1993. "Monopoly Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 549-63, August.
  8. Miguel Gines & Francisco Marhuenda, 1996. "Cost monotonic mechanisms," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 89-103, January.
  9. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 417-35, May.
  10. Subir K. Chattopadhyay, 1996. "Pareto optimal improvements for sunspots: The golden rule as a target for stabilization," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 123-135.
  11. Marhuenda, F, 1995. "Distribution of Income and Aggregation of Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 647-66, May.
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  13. Amparo Urbano Salvador & María Dolores Alepuz Domenech, 1994. "Market learning and price-dispersion," Working Papers. Serie AD 1994-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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