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Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims

  • Carmen Herrero

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del AnÂlisis EconÕmico and IVIE, Universidad de Alicante, E-03071 Alicante, Spain)

A modification of the proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims is proposed. This solution is constructed by considering an endogenous reference point. Characterization results of the aforementioned solution are provided.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 15 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 113-119

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:113-119
Note: Received: 22 December 1993/Accepted: 12 August 1996
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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September.
  2. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers 121, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992. "Bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August.
  4. Thomson, William, 1981. "A class of solutions to bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 431-441, December.
  5. Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir, 1993. "The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers 10571, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Roth, Alvin E., 1977. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-251, December.
  7. Antonio Villar Notario & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 1990. "Vector mappings with diagonal images," Working Papers. Serie AD 1990-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  8. Marhuenda, F, 1995. "Distribution of Income and Aggregation of Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 647-66, May.
  9. Bossert, Walter, 1993. "An alternative solution to bargaining problems with claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 205-220, May.
  10. Bossert, Walter, 1992. "Monotonic solutions for bargaining problems with claims," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 395-399, August.
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