IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/umamet/2010008.html

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Author

Listed:
  • Bozbay, I.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Dietrich, F.K.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Bozbay, I. & Dietrich, F.K. & Peters, H.J.M., 2010. "Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010008
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2010008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1619512/guid-b07d5040-7036-4205-9b19-329fe977a7b7-ASSET1.0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26481/umamet.2010008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
    3. Khan, Abhimanyu, 2022. "Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    4. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2025. "A coco theory for cooperative bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    5. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
    6. Rudy Henkel, 2021. "Multiself Bargaining," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 9(1), pages 28-65, June.
    7. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin, 2018. "Endogenous reference points in bargaining," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 88(2), pages 283-295, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Willems or Angie Figueroa Alarcon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/meteonl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.