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Affirmative Action and School Choice

  • Alcalde, José


    (Department of Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory)

  • Subiza, Begoña


    (Department of Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory)

This paper proposes a reform for school allocation procedures in order to help integration policies reach their objective. For this purpose, we suggest the use of a natural two-step mechanism. The (equitable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred-acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley (1962), when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale’s Top Trading Cycle. This latter step could be useful for Municipal School Boards when implementing some integration policies.

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Paper provided by Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica in its series QM&ET Working Papers with number 12-3.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_003
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  1. ALCALDE-UNZU, Jorge & MOLIS, Elena, 2009. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2009062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems," MPRA Paper 28831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562765, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Sönmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," Scholarly Articles 2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-78, December.
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Thomas J. Kane & Stephanie K. Riegg & Douglas O. Staiger, 2006. "School Quality, Neighborhoods, and Housing Prices," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 183-212.
  8. Frankel, David M. & Volij, Oscar, 2011. "Measuring School Segregation," Staff General Research Papers 35115, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2015. "Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement," MPRA Paper 62831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, October.
  11. José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
  14. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
  15. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348, August.
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