Allocating via Priorities
We design a mechanism to allocate indivisible objects that combines procedural and distributive fairness. It associates each allocation problem a family of priorities to be used when determining how agents and objects should be matched. The selection of specific priorities, correlated with agents' preferences, guarantees the (ex-ante) equity of the outcome. The analysis of our mechanism, both from the efficiency and the strategic perspectives, enables us to connect the recent literature on random assignment (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) and the traditional analysis of matching mechanisms (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
|Date of creation:||11 Jul 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: +34 965 90 36 70|
Phone: +34 965 90 36 70
Fax: +34 965 90 97 89
Web page: http://web.ua.es/es/dmcte
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
- Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011.
"Fair School Placement,"
QM&ET Working Papers
11-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
- José Alcalde Pérez & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2011. "Fair School Placement," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2011. "On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems," MPRA Paper 28831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alcalde, Jose & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2014. "Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement," QM&ET Working Papers 14-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, revised 15 Mar 2015.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
- Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
- YIlmaz, Özgür, 2010. "The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 475-491, July.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September.
- Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
- Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
- Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
- Ünver, M. Utku & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
- YIlmaz, Özgür, 2009. "Random assignment under weak preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 546-558, May.
- Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- Alcalde, José & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2015.
"Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement,"
62831, University Library of Munich, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:qmetal:2013_003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Carmona)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.