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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Hashimoto, Tadashi

    () (Institut d'\'{E}conomie Industrielle, Universit\'{e} Toulouse)

  • Hirata, Daisuke

    () (Department of Economics, Harvard University)

  • Kesten, Onur

    () (Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Kurino, Morimitsu

    () (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f\"ur Sozialforschung)

  • Ünver, M. Utku

    () (Department of Economics, Boston College)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where “sd” stands for first-order stochastic dominance).

Suggested Citation

  • Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Ünver, M. Utku, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1010
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Random assignment; probabilistic serial; ordinal fairness; sd-efficiency; sd-envy-freeness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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