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Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority

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  • Moulin, Herve

    (Rice U)

  • Cres, Moulin

    (HEC School of Management)

Abstract

In a scheduling problem where agents can opt out, we show that the familiar Random Priority (RP) a rule can be improved upon by another mechanism dubbed Probabilistic Serial (PS). Both mechanisms are nonmanipulable in a strong sense, but the latter is Pareto superior to the former and serves a larger (expected number of agents. The PS equilibrium outcome is easier to compute than the RP outcome; on the other hand RP is easier to implement than PS. We show that the improvement of PS over RP is significant but small: at most a couple of percentage points in the relative welfare gain and the relative difference in quantity served. We conjecture that the latter never exceeds 8.33 %. Both gains vanish when the number of agents is large.

Suggested Citation

  • Moulin, Herve & Cres, Moulin, 2000. "Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority," Working Papers 2000-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January.
    2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
    3. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December.
    4. Barbera, S., 1995. "Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 292.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2014. "Assigning agents to a line," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 539-553.
    2. HervÈ CrËs & HervÈ Moulin, 2003. "Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 1097-1115, August.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
    4. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    5. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2014. "Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 425-442, June.
    6. repec:hrv:faseco:32072400 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:73-79 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
    9. repec:eee:matsoc:v:90:y:2017:i:c:p:56-62 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
    11. Ruben Juarez, 2008. "The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 69-84, January.
    12. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

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