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Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources

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  • Pycia, Marek
  • Miralles, Antonio

Abstract

We study the assignment of objects in environments without transfers allowing for single-unit and general multi-unit demands, and any linear constraints, thus covering a wide range of applied environments, from school choice to course allocation. We establish the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments despite them failing the local non-satiation condition that previous studies of the Second Welfare Theorem relied on. We also prove a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. We thus show that the link between efficiency and decentralization through prices is valid in environments without transfers, and hence provide a foundation for pseudomarket- based market design by showing that the restriction to such mechanisms is without loss of generality.

Suggested Citation

  • Pycia, Marek & Miralles, Antonio, 2020. "Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15161, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15161
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    Cited by:

    1. Pycia, Marek & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Matching with Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 13994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Julien Combe & Vladyslav Nora & Olivier Tercieux, 2021. "Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms," Working Papers 2021-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Echenique, Federico & Miralles, Antonio & Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    4. Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martínez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2021. "Random assignments and outside options," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 557-566, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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