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Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities

Author

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  • Schlegel, J. C.
  • Mamageishvili, A.

Abstract

Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries, we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities. We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for random assignments. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Schlegel, J. C. & Mamageishvili, A., 2017. "Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities," Working Papers 17/05, Department of Economics, City University London.
  • Handle: RePEc:cty:dpaper:17/05
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    File URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18702/9/Dept_Econ_WP1705.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kojima, Fuhito & Manea, Mihai, 2010. "Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 106-123, January.
    2. Yinghua He & Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia & Jianye Yan, 2018. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 272-314, August.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    4. Manea, Mihai, 2008. "A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 276-281, July.
    5. Kesten, Onur & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015. "A theory of school choice lotteries," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    6. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-689, June.
    7. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1979. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 293-314, April.
    8. McLennan, Andrew, 2002. "Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 435-449, August.
    9. Haris Aziz & Bettina Klaus, 2017. "Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 17.09, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
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    Keywords

    Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market;

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