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Report NEP-DES-2018-04-16
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Schlegel, J. C. & Mamageishvili, A., 2017, "Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities," Working Papers, Department of Economics, City St George's, University of London, number 17/05.
- Gabrielle Demange, 2019, "Mechanisms in a digitalized world," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01715951.
- Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2018, "Weak fairness and the Shapley value," Working Papers, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics, number 2072/306979.
- Elliott, Matt & Nava, Francesco, 2019, "Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 87219, Jan.
- Magnac, Thierry, 2018, "Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d'allocation centralisée," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 18-899, Mar.
- Sinha, Shruti, 2018, "Identification in One-to-One Matching Models with Nonparametric Unobservables," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 18-897, Mar.