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Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence

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  • Manelli, Alejandro M

Abstract

Examples of well-behaved sequences of economies, without monotonic preferences, are constructed. These economies have core allocations that cannot be decentralized by prices, even in a weak sense. Relaxing the monotonicity assumption results in core allocations that are not uniformly integrable, breaking the connection between the continuum and the large finite model. If, in addition, preferences are nonconvex, even uniformly bounded core allocations may fail to converge in a well sense. Sufficient conditions to restore convergence are provided. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

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  • Manelli, Alejandro M, 1991. "Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 123-138, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:1:p:123-38
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November.
    2. Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia, 2017. "Large vs. Continuum Assignment Economies: Efficiency and Envy-Freeness," Working Papers 950, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
    4. Hara, Chiaki, 2005. "Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(4-5), pages 545-556, August.
    5. Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 2008. "Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1719-1741, October.
    6. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on e for non-emptiness of the e-core of an arbitrary game with side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-05, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    7. Hara, C., 2004. "Existence of Equilibria and Core Convergence in Economies with Bads," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0413, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    9. Yang, Yi-You, 2015. "On the Maximal Domain Theorem," MPRA Paper 67265, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case," Chapters,in: The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "An explicit bound on," Working Papers mwooders-98-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    12. Alejandro Manelli, 1990. "Core Convergence Without Monotone Preferences or Free Disposal," Discussion Papers 891, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Games with Many Players and Abstract Economies Permitting Differentiated Commodities, Clubs, and Public Goods," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0813, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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