Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence
Examples of well-behaved sequences of economies, without monotonic preferences, are constructed. These economies have core allocations that cannot be decentralized by prices, even in a weak sense. Relaxing the monotonicity assumption results in core allocations that are not uniformly integrable, breaking the connection between the continuum and the large finite model. If, in addition, preferences are nonconvex, even uniformly bounded core allocations may fail to converge in a well sense. Sufficient conditions to restore convergence are provided. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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