An explicit bound on
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all sufficiently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. The required size of epsilon depends on: (a) the number of approximate player types and the accuracy of this approximation; (b) the size of approximately effective small groups; (c) the size of the bound on maximal per-capita payoffs achievable in coalitions; and (d) a measure on the extent to which the payoff sets of the games are bounded away from being ``flat.'' Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-core, the parameters describing the collection.
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- Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1996. "The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 245-58.
- Kovalenkov, A. & Holtz Wooders, M., 1997.
"Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
392.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1997. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers mwooders-98-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 2000. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," Working Papers mwooders-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Alexander Kovalenkovy & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 536, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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859, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1992. "Large Games and Economies With Effective Small Groups," Discussion Paper Serie B 215, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1992.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.
- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1994. "Equivalence of Games and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1141-60, September.
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- Kovalenkov, A. & Wooders, M.H., 1997. "Three Theorems on Non-Emptiness of Approximate Cores: Part 1. Game Theoretic Results," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 390.97, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Shubik, Martin & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "Approximate cores of replica games and economies. Part I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 27-48, October.
- Wooders, Myrna Holtz & Zame, William R, 1984. "Approximate Cores of Large Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1327-50, November.
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