The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments
We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.
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Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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